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Legal
Developments
Auditors’ Liability to Investors for Clients’ Inadequate Disclosure
or
The Auditor as Police Dog
Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

GUEST WRITER: This column was written by
Margaret R. Liles, a staff auditor with the
Seattle office of Price Waterhouse & Co. Ms.
Liles recently received her M.B.A. from the
University of Washington.

The article is in twoparts and will be concluded
in the July 1976 issue.

Introduction
In 1896 Lord Justice Lopes characterized
the responsibilities of an auditor for the
detection of fraud by restating criteria
which for years have been accepted as the
proper test of auditors' liability:
"[An auditor] is a watch dog, but not
a bloodhound. He is justified in
believing tried servants of the com
pany in whom confidence is placed
by the company. He is entitled to
assume that they are honest, and to
rely upon their representations,
provided he takes reasonable care. If
there is anything calculated to excite
suspicion he should probe it to the
bottom; but in the absence of any
thing of that kind he is only bound
to be reasonably cautious and care
ful.
. . . ."Auditors must not be made
liable for not tracking out ingenious
and carefully laid schemes of fraud
when there is nothing to arouse
their suspicion, and when those
frauds are perpetrated by tried ser
vants of the company and are unde
tected for years by the directors. So
to hold would make the position of
an auditor intolerable."1

In view of the explosive growth of
securities law fraud litigation in recent
years and recent court cases imposing
22 / The Woman CPA

professional liability under the securities
laws, it is respectfully submitted that Lord
Justice Lopes' view is obsolete and that the
role of the auditor, at least in the eyes of
the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), is not even that of bloodhound —
much less watchdog — in fact, it now
seems to have become that of police dog.
The auditor's duties as police dog and
the emerging grounds for liability as im
posed by recent cases are in this article
analyzed in terms of three functions: 1) the
duty to investigate (the "Sniff" Function),
2) the duty to disclose (the "Bark" Func
tion), and 3) the duty to alert authorities
(the "Bite" Function). Some consequences
for accountants of the new standards of
liability and the auditor's new role as
police dog are also explored.

Background
Legal Basis for Liability
Any liability of an account for improper
disclosure by a client must be in the nature
of a derived liability — that is, the client
must first do something illegal and the
accountant must be deemed liable as a
participant or aider and abettor in some
fashion. In order to understand accoun
tants' liability, it is thus essential first to
explore the basis on which the client
becomes liable.
The statutory and regulatory provisions
most frequently relied upon in private
litigation by investors charging securities
fraud in financings are Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Ex
change Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any
person (using the jurisdictional in
strumentalities of the mails or interstate

commerce) in connection with the pur
chase or sale of a security: "1) to employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
2) to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the state
ments made, in the light of the circum
stances under which they were made, not
misleading or, 3) to engage in any act,
practice or course of business which oper
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person . .
In connection with a fully-registered
offering of securities, civil liability for
damages to any purchaser of the securities
for material misstatements or omissions
contained in the financial statements in a
registration statement is expressly im
posed upon auditors, as well as upon the
issuing corporation, its officers, directors,
certain experts and underwriters, by Sec
tion 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Language substantially similar to that
contained in Rule 10b-5 is used in other
sections of the federal securities laws to
give investors a cause of action against
sellers of securities for material misstate
ments or omissions in prospectuses and
other communications,2 proxy solicita
tions by registered companies,3 tender
offers,4 and documents filed with the SEC
under the Exchange Act.5 Moreover, in
most state securities laws ("Blue Sky"
Laws) there is an express civil liability
section akin to Section 12 of the Securities
Act and a general antifraud provision very
similar to Rule 10b-5.
Rule 10b-5 contains broad provisions
which are not limited to a financing in
which a corporation receives proceeds
from the sale of securities. General finan

cial information which could foreseeably
cause investors to purchase or sell a com
pany's securities, such as that issued in
press releases and periodic reports to
shareholders, may lead to liability of a
company under Rule 10b-5 if such infor
mation contains material misstatements or
omissions.6 Notably absent in the lan
guage of Rule 10b-5 is any delineation of
duties owed, or by whom and to whom
such duties may be owed. It has been left
to the courts to interpret the Rule and
fashion a standard of conduct for liability
and successful defense thereof in 10b-5
cases.

The party initially and principally re
sponsible for fraudulent conduct in securi
ties fraud cases in which an independent
accountant is involved is usually the ac
countant's client company and its man
agement. Securities fraud has come to
mean imperfect disclosure as to all mate
rial facts in official company statements —
a very different concept from the willful or
criminal fraud of the common law variety
traditionally referred to in the literature of
the accounting profession. Financial in
formation is initially the undertaking of
the client. The independent accountant's
undertaking in these matters is tra
ditionally limited to the expression of an
opinion on the fairness of the financial
statements furnished by the client for re
view.
If accountants are liable, they usually
would be so on a derived or secondary
basis for having participated in or aided
and abetted the illegal conduct of a client.
By means of their opinion issued on the
misleading financial statements or their
association with unaudited statements or
other data, the auditors may be charged
with participating in or aiding and abet
ting the misstatement or omission of ma
terial information. Recent securities fraud
litigation typically includes charges that
accountants, as a result of their work pur
suant to the audit engagement, either
knew or should have known of their
client's disclosure deficiencies and thus
may be liable to investors on an aider and
abettor theory.

Current SEC Crusade for Higher
Professional Standards (i.e. Greater
Liability)
In recent years the SEC has undertaken a
drive to hold accountants to higher pro
fessional standards. This drive has been
conducted through SEC lawsuits against
members of the accounting profession,
public expression of views by SEC Com
missioners and its Chief Accountant, and
SEC amicus curiae briefs in civil lawsuits.

Commissioner Sommer quite correctly
points out that accountants are in a unique
strategic position, by virtue of their power
and traditional independence, to influ
ence corporate behavior, to detect securi
ties frauds in the incipiency, and to nip a
fraud before it blossoms.7 Moreover, the
popular (albeit perhaps misguided) view
is that the presence of a reputable accoun
tant in a business transaction constitutes
an assurance, if not legitimacy, of at least
accurate presentation. In Commissioner
Sommer's view, the public's expectations
in this regard should be met to the extent
practicable.8
SEC Chief Accountant Burton echoes
Commissioner Sommer on the policies
behind recent enforcement activities by
the Commission involving professionals:

"... The SEC enforcement program
is designed to maintain the integrity
of the market place and deter fraud
. . .: these professionals are an
essential element in providing ac
cess to the market place, since the
sale of securities cannot take place
without their involvement. Profes
sional responsibility at these points
of access can prevent many ques
tionable activities before they occur
"9

The key issue in the crusade for in
creased accountants' responsibility for
proper disclosure by their clients in busi
ness transactions has been aptly stated by
former Chairman Garrett:
"The problem... is the involvement
of accountants and lawyers in the
failure of issuers to comply with the
requirements of our laws for full and
fair disclosure of material informa
tion."10

In Garrett's view, a really successful fraud
cannot be accomplished in our complex
financial world without the help of ac
countants and lawyers. He views the ac
countants' proper role as that of police
officers — to insist in their corporate and
financial practice upon compliance with
the law in accordance with professional
standards. Garrett praises the efforts of
the accounting profession to enunciate
professional standards and guidelines,
but he adds the following caveat:

". . .The final goal of full and fair
disclosure must in the end govern
over the mechanical adherence to
any conceivable checklist. . . . Ac
countants and lawyers are in the
front line of law enforcement, help
ing to achieve the goals of . . . full
and fair disclosure to investors
"11

This then is the sum and substance of
the SEC's crusade: the SEC has deputized
each and every accountant and attorney to
be an enforcement agent of the Commis
sion in the detection and prevention of
securities fraud. Moreover, the SEC
would involve public accountants in areas
in which accountants have traditionally
refused to accept responsibility, such as
interim reports and press releases.
Nonetheless, speeches by SEC Commis
sioners also state that it is not expected
that "auditors . .. become insurers against
all forms of management fraud, however
carefully concealed,"11 but only in "ap
propriate cases."12 If auditors have been
sufficiently careful and are merely victims
of the client's duplicity, they should not be
liable. The unanswered question, of
course, is: how careful is sufficiently care
ful?

Flexible Duty Standard
The SEC's theory is that the extent of an
accountant's duty to investigate and dis
close material facts will be determined in
the light of the surrounding circumstances
of the particular case, with emphasis upon
a CPA's duty to the investing public.
Commissioner Sommer indicates that
with respect to Rule 10b-5 violations the
old mechanistic application of traditional
common law concepts (such as scienter,
reliance, etc.) is eroding, and that trying to
measure conduct by such ambiguous con
cepts is "a bit of a waste of time." Instead,
Commissioner Sommer, quoting exten
sively from the recent Ninth Circuit opin
ion in White v. Abrams,13 advocates a
flexible duty standard, whereby
"... one must look to the nature of
the duty properly imposed upon the
auditor, the extent to which his [sic]
work is expectably relied upon, the
indications of departure from ac
cepted norms of the profession, the
suggestions of submission to pres
sures from clients, the extent of his
[sic] awareness of the picture the
financial statements present to one
relying upon them, and the serious
ness of the consequences if care is
not exercised."14

Hence, most suits against accountants
under Rule 10b-5 would not be dismissed
for lack of scienter (knowledge and intent
to deceive) and would proceed to trial. An
accountant's duties would thus presum
ably be subjectively determined by each
jury on a case-by-case basis. The courts, in
applying the flexible duty standard advo
cated by Commissioner Sommer, would
assess the duties and degree of care
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applied by accountants in each specific
factual context. An accountant could be
held liable to investors for a client's in
adequate disclosure even though she or he
was unaware of the error. As Commis
sioner Sommer notes, application of the
flexible duty standard by the courts would
undoubtedly result in an upgrading of
performance by CPAs,15 and the fear of
liability is an effective, albeit costly,
stimulus to increased diligence and better
disclosure.
Many legal commentators expect the
flexible duty standard for professional
liability espoused by the court in White v.
Abrams will be adopted by other circuit
courts in cases brought under Rule 10b-5
in the future. For public accountants the
prospect of such increased exposure to
liability for breach of duty, coupled with
the magnitude of damages generally in
volved in securities law cases, is unset
tling, to say the least, particularly if such
duties are to be defined in an unpredicta
ble fashion.

The Sniff Function — Auditors'
Liability for Inadequate
Investigation

One application of the flexible duty
standard for accountant defendants is il
lustrated by Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,16 a
case on appeal from the Seventh Circuit to
the Supreme Court.
The underlying fraud in this case was
committed by Leston B. Nay, president
and 92% owner of First Securities Com
pany of Chicago, a small brokerage firm.
Nay had created certain spurious escrow
accounts in which some of his brokerage
customers (plaintiffs) had invested, and
he had secretly used the funds for his own
purposes. The injured investors claimed
that Ernst & Ernst, auditors of First Securi
ties Company, were negligent in perform
ing their audit, that is, in failing to dis
cover (i.e. sniff out) and follow up by
additional testing the existence of Nay's
"mail rule," whereby only Nay was to
open mail addressed to him, even when
he was absent from the office, and Ernst &
Ernst was thereby guilty of facilitating or
aiding and abetting Nay's concealed
fraud.
The Hochfelder court focused on the
auditor's duties to investors in analyzing
the necessary elements for aiding and
abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5. After
rejecting the contention that proof of the
auditors' knowledge of their client's
fraudulent scheme is necessary to main
tain a claim against them, the court found
it necessary to show only that, if the
defendant had a duty of inquiry,

"The party charged with aiding and
abetting had knowledge of or, but for
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a breach of the duty of inquiry, should
have had knowledge of the fraud, and
that possessing such knowledge the
party failed to act due to an improp
er motive or breach of a duty of
disclosure."17 [Emphasis supplied.]
This case is somewhat unusual in that
the auditors' client who committed the
fraud was a brokerage firm, required by
statute18 to file audited annual financial
statements with the SEC. Hence, because
of their audit engagement, the auditors,
Ernst & Ernst, had a statutory duty of
inquiry which inured to investors. Be
cause there was no proof of reliance on the
auditors' report by the injured investors,
the court found no common law duty of
inquiry. The expansion of auditors' re
sponsibilities to investors under the secu
rities laws beyond the duties imposed by
common law standards is thus well illus
trated by this case.
The Hochfelder case stands for the prop
osition that whenever an audit is done
pursuant to some statutory requirement
for filing financial statements with the
SEC, (such as a prospectus, a 10-K report,
and perhaps an annual report to share
holders) the auditor who breaches a duty
of inquiry due to failure to sniff out fraud
may be liable to investors under Rule
10b-5. This would result although inves
tors have not seen the auditor's report,
although the auditor is unaware of the
client's fraud, and although there is no
privity of contract between auditor and
investor. In circumstances not involving
SEC filings, if investors actually rely on
the auditor's report, presumably the req
uisite duty of inquiry would also be
found to flow to investors.
It thus is not difficult for a court to find
that auditors have a duty to sniff long and
hard at the financial condition of their
client. Whether or not liability will be
imposed will then be determined by a
finding of negligence in the audit resulting
in breach of that duty, which also is an
issue of fact to be determined at trial. The
Hochfelder court appears to lend some
comfort to accountants in that the court
says that if auditors follow generally ac
cepted auditing standards (GAAS) in
conducting their audit review, they will be
protected from liability to investors for
failing to detect fraud.
Unfortunately, GAAS do not often spell
out precise procedures an auditor should
follow, and auditing procedures are often
a matter of judgment. From the benefit of
hindsight it is almost always possible to
perceive additional steps an auditor could,
and thus presumably should, have taken
to lead to the uncovering of a client's
fraudulent conduct. Since the adequacy of

an auditor's auditing procedures is to be
an issue of fact to be determined at trial,
and since even accountants will have dif
fering opinions as to what should have
been done in close cases, it should not be
difficult for plaintiffs in many such cases to
provide expert witnesses who will assert
that the defendant auditors should have
taken additional steps. It follows that the
wide latitude in determining whether or
not there has been compliance with GAAS
means that attempted reliance upon
GAAS offers little assurance of protection
from liability to investors in the cases
which by virtue of hindsight are "close
cases."
In the second and concluding part of
this article, we will explore the "Bark" and
"Bite" functions and whether or not old
dogs can be taught new tricks.
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